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This Article rejects a central claim of taxation and private law theory, namely, 
Kaplow and Shavell’s prominent thesis that egalitarian social goals are most 
efficiently achieved through income taxation and transfer, as opposed to egalitarian 
alterations in private law rules. Kaplow and Shavell compare the efficiency of rules of 
tort to rules of tax and transfer in meeting egalitarian goals, concluding that taxation 
and transfer is always more efficient than other private law legal rules. We argue that 
Kaplow and Shavell reach this conclusion only through inattention to the body of 
private law that informs the very basis of their discussion: underlying property 
entitlements. This Article contends that Kaplow and Shavell’s comparison of rules of 
taxation to rules of tort fails to take proper account of the powerful role that 
(re)assigning underlying property entitlements plays in achieving egalitarian goals, 
even at the level of formal theory. We conclude that, contrary to Kaplow and Shavell’s 
prominent claim, as a matter of efficiency, the rules of income taxation and transfer 
are not always preferable to alterations in the initial assignment of property 
entitlements in achieving distributive or egalitarian goals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A central question in the construction of rules for any legal regime 
is what demands or values govern which sets of rules or legal doctrines. 
In terms of “private law” (for example, property, contract and tort), a 
perennial debate has centered on the tension between welfare or wealth 
maximization and the distributive consequences of legal rules.1 Consider 
a hotel located on a stretch of beach. The governing legal regime will need 
to construct property rules about beach access.2 If the legal regime aims 
 
 1. See, e.g., Anthony Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980); 
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (9th ed. 2014); Todd D. Rakoff, The Five Justices of 
Contract Law, 2016 WISC. L. REV. 733 (2016); ADITI BAGCHI, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND CONTRACT, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 193 (Gregory Klass et al. eds., 2014). 
 2. E.g., State of Oregon ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 672 (Or. 1969) (contemplating 
allowing private enclosure of the dry sand portion of the beach, a prescriptive easement, or open access 
by way of custom). 
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at wealth maximization, perhaps access will be limited to hotel guests. 
The privacy may attract wealthy clients and, all things considered, 
promote the overall maximization of wealth. On the other hand, if the 
legal regime aims to promote the interests of the least well-off, public 
access to the beach might be selected as the relevant property rule. 
Other such trade-offs abound: In a tort case, a worker has lost his 
hand while operating a meat-grinding machine. From a welfare or wealth 
maximization perspective, if the Learned Hand balancing test results in 
favor of the manufacturer,3 no liability should be imposed. That is, 
doctrinally, tort should be constructed so as to impose the cost of the lost 
hand on the injured worker, such as through the operation of a doctrine 
of contributory negligence.4 However, if the same scenario is considered 
from the perspective of the least well-off, more cost might be borne by 
the manufacturer to protect workers, even the clumsy or illiterate, from 
serious bodily harm. Meeting this alternative concern might demand that 
the manufacturer be held liable, such as through the construction of a 
doctrine of negligence or product liability.5 
Consider yet another example, a landlord and tenant have a dispute 
over the condition of rented premises. Perhaps a doctrinal construction 
answering to the wealth maximization principle should rule in favor of 
the landlord, while one concerned with the position of the least well-off 
should rule for the tenant.6 Finally, in another property case, a poor 
property-owner is subject to a public taking of her land.7 Again, assume 
 
 3. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.) 
(balancing cost of precautions versus probability of accident and magnitude of harm). 
 4. See Masters v. N.Y. Cent. R. Co., 70 N.E.2d 898, 903 (Ohio 1947). 
 5. Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d 264, 271 (2d Cir. 1999) (Calabresi, J.) (affirming the jury’s 
verdict imposing liability on manufacturer on the grounds that it “could reasonably find that there 
exist people who are employed as meat grinders and who do not know (a) that it is feasible to reduce 
the risk with safety guards . . . and (c) that the grinders should be used only with the guards.”); cf., 
Lorenzo v. Wirth, 49 N.E. 1010, 1011 (Mass. 1898) (Holmes, J.) (“A heap of coal on a sidewalk in Boston 
is an indication, according to common experience, that there very possibly may be a coal hole to receive 
it.”). 
 6. See Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079–80 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Wright, J.): 
The inequality in bargaining power between landlord and tenant has been well documented. 
Tenants have very little leverage to enforce demands for better housing. Various 
impediments to competition in the rental housing market, such as racial and class 
discrimination and standardized form leases, mean that landlords place tenants in a take it 
or leave it situation. The increasingly severe shortage of adequate housing further increases 
the landlord’s bargaining power and escalates the need for maintaining and improving the 
existing stock. Finally, the findings by various studies of the social impact of bad housing 
has led to the realization that poor housing is detrimental to the whole society, not merely 
to the unlucky ones who must suffer the daily indignity of living in a slum . . . In our 
judgment the common law itself must recognize the landlord’s obligation to keep his 
premises in a habitable condition. 
Id.  
 7. See Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005):  
BLANKFEIN-69.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/22/17  12:40 AM 
4 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1 
 
that wealth maximization, beyond mere transaction costs, requires that 
the seizure of property proceed, but distributive concerns for the least 
well-off will demand an outcome in favor of the property owner. These 
examples illustrate the pervasive nature of the tension between wealth 
maximization and distributive concerns, and the necessity for law to 
adjudicate between these competing values. 
The examples above, drawn from tort and property law, illustrate 
that the substance of private law is closely implicated in the distributive 
pattern of wealth. This connection between private law structures and 
public distributive values is so pervasive that legal scholars acknowledge 
the difficulty of isolating exactly where in law any such distinction lies, 
and to what extent particular bodies of law represent public versus 
private values.8 
Noted legal scholars Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell famously 
offer an ingenious solution to this conundrum. Their claim is that, even 
if one is committed to the welfare of the least well-off members of society, 
the rules of private law should nonetheless be constructed with the aim 
 
Two polar propositions are perfectly clear. On the one hand, it has long been accepted that 
the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another 
private party B, even though A is paid just compensation. On the other hand, it is equally 
clear that a State may transfer property from one private party to another if future ‘use by 
the public’ is the purpose of the taking; the condemnation of land for a railroad with 
common-carrier duties is a familiar example. 
Id. 
For cases with even clearer equity-welfare tensions, consider Columbia University’s dispute with its 
neighbors, including a modest auto-repair shop, see Robin Finn, Pushing Back as Columbia Moves to 
Spread Out, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2008), as well as China’s recent experience in deploying ‘takings’ to 
expand economic growth. Michael Wines & Jonathan Ansfield, Trampled in a Land Rush, Chinese 
Resist, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2010) (“The country’s property boom has spawned new cities, remade 
older ones and¾not incidentally¾helped float the buoyant economy that is a bedrock of Communist 
Party legitimacy. But its benefits are spread unevenly.”). 
 8. Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REV. 257, 257 (1960); Charles A. 
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (calling the bounds of the traditional distinction 
into question); Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, On Belling the Cat: Rawls and Tort as 
Corrective Justice, 92 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1289 (2006) (“[t]here is no principled or foundational 
distinction in Rawls between public and private matters; for Rawls, freedom and the private realm are 
constructed by the principles of justice.”); Thomas Scanlon has distinguished between legal rules or 
legal rights and underlying values, maintaining that legal rules and rights can take many forms, but 
must ultimately be designed to account for the correct balance of values or principles:  
Rights, understood as institutional constraints and prerogatives, can “clash” . . . What we 
need to do in such a case is to adjust our understanding of these [legal] rights so as to make 
them coherent. This adjustment is not best understood, I think, as a matter of ‘balancing’ 
[legal] rights against one another . . . . It is true, however, that in deciding which 
readjustment of these [legal] rights to accept, we may need to “balance” certain 
values . . . against one another . . . . [V]alues are balanced, [legal] rights are adjusted, or 
redefined. 
T. M. Scanlon, Adjusting Rights and Balancing Values, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1477, 1478–79 (2004). 
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of wealth maximization. Any distributive pattern is more efficiently met 
through the use of income taxation and its inverse, equity-oriented 
income transfer, rather than through the construction and deployment 
of more egalitarian private law rules.9 Kaplow and Shavell’s prominent 
conclusion calls into question the wisdom of directly focusing on the 
needs of the least well-off in constructing rules of private law. To be clear, 
they address the efficiency of the competing means of achieving 
distributive goals, and not the desirability of egalitarian goals 
themselves. 
Kaplow and Shavell’s claim is significant. If their conclusion is 
correct, equity-oriented private law rules can be best understood as 
inefficient, though well-intentioned, means to achieve egalitarian 
political goals. This implicates a vast range of law and legal doctrine: 
minimum wage laws,10 much of landlord-tenant doctrine,11 substantive 
unconscionability,12 many nonjudicial remedies for past injustices (that 
is government established minority “set-asides” in contracting,13 
reparations for slavery or Jim Crow14 or affirmative action programs in 
hiring and education15), protection of pregnancy and maternity in an 
employment relationship,16 the invocation of the “role model” theory in 
educational hiring,17 and section 1981 legislation.18 Kaplow and Shavell 
 
 9. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 35–37 (2002) [hereinafter 
FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? 
Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
821, 821 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?]; Louis Kaplow & 
Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 669 (1994) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less 
Efficient]; see also Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rule 
Making: Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 
414 (1981). 
 10. For a discussion of efficiency, fairness, and their implications for the scope of minimum wage 
laws, see generally Christine Jolls, Fairness, Minimum Wage Law and Employee Benefits, 77 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 47 (2002). 
 11. See Javins, 428 F.2d at 1071. 
 12. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449–50 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Wright, J.). 
 13. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–99 (1989). 
 14. E.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in 
America, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279 (2003). 
 15. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 16. Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ Rights Movement and Family 
Inequalities, 102 VA. L. REV. 79 (2016); Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the 
Legal Construction of Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 492–93 (2011). 
 17. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(A) (2009): 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every 
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to 
the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property 
as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, 
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counsel against the use of private law rules and instead favor the use of 
income taxation and transfer. 
Contemporary political liberalism typically demands that political 
and economic institutions reflect, in some measure, equity-oriented 
distributive aims.19 But, as previously mentioned, legal scholars disagree 
over which institutions should be designated to serve the goals of 
distributive principles. Some argue that equity-oriented values are best 
served not only by a system of taxation and transfer, but also by the 
application of other legal rules, such as the rules of contract and tort.20 
Other scholars, agreeing with Kaplow and Shavell, argue that, for 
efficiency reasons, non-tax and transfer legal rules ought to be 
constructed to maximize wealth, and demand that these rules be 
sanitized of equity-oriented values. These scholars maintain that those 
egalitarian values are most efficiently met by a system of income taxation 
and transfer. It is important to note that this controversy is not over 
differing conceptions of political liberalism, or the distributive principles 
they bear. Instead, the dispute takes as given the equity-oriented 
institutional demands of distributive principles associated with various 
forms of contemporary egalitarian liberalism. The controversy, then, is 
distinctly over institutional design; namely, the question of which aspects 
 
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.  
 19. E.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); Samuel Freeman, 
Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertarianism is Not a Liberal View, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105 (2002); 
THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY (1991); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
 20. E.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 276–312 (1986) (for at least tort law if not contract 
law); Patrick Emerton & Kathryn James, The Justice of the Tax Base and the Case for Income Tax, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TAX LAW 125 (Monica Bhandari ed., 2017); LYN K L TJON SOEI LEN, 
MINIMUM CONTRACT JUSTICE: A CAPABILITIES PERSPECTIVE ON SWEATSHOPS AND CONSUMER CONTRACTS 
(2017); Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, 
Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Aditi Bagchi, 
Distributive Justice and Private Law, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 105, 107 (2008); Guido Calabresi, The New 
Economic Analysis of Law: Scholarship, Sophistry, or Self-Indulgence?, 68 PROC. BRITISH ACAD. 85, 
95–96 (1982); Daniela Caruso, Contract Law and Distribution in the Age of Welfare Reform, 49 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 665, 668 (2007); Josse Klijnsma, Contract Law as Fairness, 28 RATIO JURIS 68, 74 (2015); 
Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Taxation, the Private Law, and Distributive Justice, 23 
SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 142, 146 (2006); Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules 
and Social Justice, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (1994) (arguing that bankruptcy, but not, for example, 
tort law, should be set to wealth-maximization); Chris Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as 
Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797, 800 (2000); Samuel Scheffler, 
Distributive Justice, the Basic Structure and the Place of Private Law, 35 OXFORD J.L. STUD. 213 
(2015); Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective 
Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1802, 1831 (1997) (“[d]eterrence can [serve] . . . the somewhat austere 
goal of economic efficiency, [it] also has deep roots in a humane and compassionate view of the law’s 
functions [and continues] But if accident prevention is an economic goal, it is also a generous, warm-
hearted, compassionate, and humane goal. As such, it is a goal that can be and is in fact supported by 
a broad range of scholars.”); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 336, 338–40 (1993); Kronman, supra note 1. 
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of economic, legal and political institutions most efficiently serve the 
equity-oriented demands of liberalism. 
Kaplow and Shavell’s claim that political liberalism’s distributive 
demands are most efficiently met though income taxation and transfer is 
one of the most prominent claims in private law and tax policy 
scholarship.21 If correct, the claim invites the conclusion that 
contemporary egalitarian liberals ought to adopt the wealth-maximizing 
conception of private law and achieve all desired equity-oriented 
demands through income taxation and transfer. The truth of this 
theoretical claim would have wide ranging ramifications for public policy 
and “real world” legal and political institutions. The claim purports to 
prescribe a rare efficiency-improving option to political liberalism.22 
There have been criticisms of Kaplow and Shavell’s claim at the 
practical or policy level. We will briefly discuss these criticisms below, 
however, our critique engages primarily with their theoretical claim. 
Chris Sanchirico relaxes the assumption that individuals are equally 
able to exercise the care needed to avoid accidents.23 If the least-skilled 
(in terms of producing income) are also the most likely to commit torts, 
Sanchirico finds that tort damages should be set below the level that is 
maximally efficient to wealth-creation,24 given that one’s conception of 
liberalism involves a commitment to equity-oriented values. Christine 
 
 21. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ET AL., PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 117 n.8 (3d ed. 2002) 
(“Should private law take into account the wealth of litigants involved in a particular civil case? Most 
law-and-economics scholars argue it should not, on the grounds that private-law rules are inferior 
distributive mechanisms compared to broader tax and welfare programs.”) (citing Kaplow & Shavell, 
Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?, supra note 9); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 112 (3d ed. 2000); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 124 
(2d ed. 1989); Robert C. Ellickson, The Affirmative Duties of Property Owners: An Essay for Tom 
Merrill, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 43, 66 (2014) (“[m]ost law-and-economics 
scholars . . . conclude that distributive goals are better pursued by means of broad tax and welfare 
programs than by the introduction of distributive considerations into the rules for resolving ordinary 
private law disputes.”) [hereinafter Ellickson, The Affirmative Duties of Property Owners]; Lee Anne 
Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 
1051, 1062 (2016) (“Our sense today is that both the K&S result and the policy advice have become the 
conventional wisdom, at least among many law professors who employ economic analysis.”); Kyle 
Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance,  
56 TAX L. REV. 157 (2003); Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal 
Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1654 (1998) (“Many law and economics scholars have urged that legal 
rules be chosen solely with an eye towards Kaldor-Hicks efficiency . . . these scholars often urge that 
distributional considerations be addressed (if they are to be addressed at all) exclusively through the 
tax and welfare systems.”) (citing Kaplow and Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient, supra 
note 9). 
 22. See James M. Buchanan, The Relevance of Pareto Optimality, 6 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 341 
(1962); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211, 
1212 (1991). 
 23. Sanchirico, supra note 20, at 801–02. 
 24. Sanchirico, supra note 20, at 818. 
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Jolls has called attention to the fact that, given the insights of behavioral 
economics, equal (expected) amounts of (re)distribution via taxation and 
the tort system may not cause equivalent effects on work effort,25 as 
Kaplow and Shavell assume. Richard Markovits has objected to Kaplow 
and Shavell’s conclusion regarding tax and transfer not only on moral 
grounds, but also argues that certain qualifications to their argument are, 
empirically, quite important.26 In a recent article,27 Lee Anne Fennell and 
Richard H. McAdams make a critique that is grounded in a transaction 
cost (and political action cost) analysis. They do not, however, engage 
with Kaplow and Shavell’s theoretical claim.28 
This Article addresses an essential aspect of Kaplow and Shavell’s 
argument which appears to be incompletely understood:29 the manner in 
which the most fundamental legal rules are constructed, that is the rules 
which define entitlements and property arrangements, the very question 
of what counts as property, and the role that transaction costs play in 
making proper property assignments. This Article addresses the question 
of the form that property rules might take; that is, the question of 
whether equity-oriented values are most efficiently met entirely through 
income taxation and transfer, or, to some degree, through the selection 
of the rules of property and entitlement. Kaplow and Shavell’s purported 
efficiency advantage of tax and transfer is cast as a comparison of tax and 
transfer to individual rules of tort or contract,30 without attention to the 
selection of underlying property arrangements, thereby generating the 
broad conclusion that tax and transfer is preferable because it is most 
efficient. However, each body of law, whether contract, tort, or taxation, 
requires underlying property rules that define the details of ownership. 
We argue that Kaplow and Shavell’s conclusion that income taxation and 
transfer is most efficient has failed to properly take into account these 
underlying property rules, and for this reason, it should be rejected. This 
Article argues that maximal efficiency in meeting equity-oriented 
distributive aims will, at times, demand that such aims be met via  
non-tax and transfer legal rules, such as those of property and basic 
entitlement. 
 
 25. Jolls, supra note 21, at 1656–67. 
 26. Richard S. Markovits, Why Kaplow and Shavell’s “Double-Distortion Argument” Articles Are 
Wrong, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 511, 519–20 (2005). 
 27. Fennell & McAdams, supra note 21. 
 28. Id. at 1056–57 (distinguishing between Kaplow and Shavell’s formal theoretical claim and 
policy prescriptions and stating “we do not take issue with” the former). 
 29. See Zachary Liscow, Note, Reducing Inequality on the Cheap: When Legal Rule Design 
Should Incorporate Equity as Well as Efficiency, 123 YALE L.J. 2478 (2014); see also infra notes  
81–88 and accompanying text. 
 30. E.g., Polinsky, supra note 21, at 124. 
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To illustrate this point, return to our first example concerning beach 
access (based on the Oregon case of Thornton v. Hay31). Assume that the 
applicable legal regime was initially aimed at wealth maximization, 
limiting beach access to hotel guests. However, perhaps the political 
process has changed the nature of the legal regime, such that it now aims 
to maximize the position of the least advantaged of society. Kaplow and 
Shavell’s advice would be to retain the limited beach access, and to limit 
the pursuit of welfare for the disadvantaged to tax and transfer. But this 
cannot always be the correct advice. By abandoning the pursuit of wealth 
maximization, the new legal regime will, by definition, feature less 
wealth, but also improved equality. This may entail fewer wealthy 
vacationers, making it suboptimal to devote the entire beach to hotel 
guests. A new property rule may be called for, allowing for some public 
access. This new property entitlement may not emerge through contract. 
Thus, in these circumstances, the legal regime pursuing the new 
maximand must alter the property rule governing beach access in order 
to promote the interests of the least well-off. Legal rules, other than those 
related to tax, must respond to an increased interest in distributional 
outcomes. 
I.  KAPLOW AND SHAVELL 
A. KAPLOW AND SHAVELL’S ARGUMENT 
Kaplow and Shavell’s argument has a clear and intuitive appeal: 
whatever equity-oriented distribution might be obtained through 
harnessing legal rules could also be obtained through a system of income 
taxation and transfer.32 The use of non-tax and transfer legal rules, 
however, has additional inefficiencies associated with it. That is, it 
 
 31. State of Oregon ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969). 
 32. Kaplow and Shavell’s argument assumes that individuals maximize expected utility, Kaplow 
& Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient, supra note 9, at 678. They do not, however, appear 
to hold (unrealistically) that the conditions under which the Coase Theorem applies are in place across 
the entire range of private legal rules. “The result might appear to depend on some features of the 
utility function¾notably, risk neutrality, the lack of income effects, and care being independent of 
ability. Relaxing these assumptions would make determination of the efficient legal rule more 
complicated. It would remain true, however, that if the redistribution accomplished through an 
inefficient legal rule were instead achieved through a modification of the tax system, resources would 
be saved and all individuals could be made better off.” Supra note 9, 679. Thus, the Coase Theorem’s 
assumption of no wealth effects is not assumed in Kaplow and Shavell’s discussion. They do not 
mention perfect information or zero transaction costs (which imply no strategic bargaining), 
assumptions which would be very strong indeed across the range of all legal rules, particularly once 
one considers property regimes, where bargaining and information problems are endemic. Cf. Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 782, 787 (1990). One 
cannot assume, therefore, in the context of Kaplow and Shavell’s analysis, assets find themselves 
assigned to their highest value use through private bargaining.  
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achieves its distributive goal by affecting economic activity in ways other 
than through the direct redistribution of income (tax and transfer’s only 
direct effect).33 Tax and transfer, Kaplow and Shavell argue, is more 
efficient in meeting equity-oriented aims than is the harnessing of other 
legal rules because tax and transfer creates fewer economic “distortions” 
than, for example, the use of tort, which not only would redistribute 
income, but also would be departing from optimal deterrence. 
Redistribution of income away from the wealth-maximizing outcome, 
whether done via taxation or tort, creates economic “dead-weight loss.” 
But according to Kaplow and Shavell, tort imposes the added burden of 
inefficiently altering standards of due care.34 
Kaplow and Shavell’s analysis considers the use of a tort rule to 
transfer wealth from the better-off to the less well-off in order to satisfy 
equity-oriented demands. Tort liability for the less well-off might be 
reduced, leaving them with more money than they would otherwise have, 
were they subject to a more optimally wealth-maximizing liability rule. 
Such a move, however, in addition to effecting some amount of efficiency 
loss during the transfer and the attendant impact on work and 
investment incentives, would deviate from optimal deterrence.35 The 
result is that the less-advantaged would, on average, use less than the 
optimal standard of care, resulting in a sociallyinefficient increase in 
accidents. Contrast this scenario with one that uses income taxation and 
transfer to achieve the identical equity-oriented distributive end. In that 
scenario, one also creates the standard inefficiency associated with 
taxation,36 namely, the “distortion” of the investment incentive and 
labor-leisure trade-off,37 but not the “additional” loss from nonoptimal 
incentives to take due care. This additional loss is what one might 
describe as a “double distortion.” 
The argument goes, when legal rules are constructed to maximize 
wealth, and equity-oriented demands are to be met solely through 
taxation and transfer, maximal efficiency will be achieved. This 
arrangement is purportedly conducive to the creation of additional 
wealth, which may, in turn, be taxed in service to distributive aims. 
 
 33. Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient, supra note 9, at 667.  
 34. Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient, supra note 9, at 669.  
 35. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.); WILLIAM 
M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987). 
 36. While Kaplow and Shavell focus on the labor-leisure tradeoff, Kaplow & Shavell, Why the 
Legal System Is Less Efficient, supra note 9, at 670–71 n.5, this effect can be seen as an example of 
the broader case in which increasing income tax rates leads to decreasing net taxable income. See 
Martin Feldstein, The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income, 103 J. POL. ECON. 551,  
552–55 (1995). 
 37. E.g., Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New 
Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1905, 1920 (1987). 
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Egalitarian liberals would thus be well advised to prefer systems of 
income taxation and transfer to address equity-oriented demands. In 
order to avoid economic waste (an important constraint in meeting most 
plausible distributive aims), egalitarian political liberals ought to adopt a 
scheme of wealth-maximizing private law rules, in conjunction with a tax 
and transfer scheme that serves any desired equity-oriented distributive 
aims. 
B. THE SCOPE OF KAPLOW AND SHAVELL’S CLAIM 
Kaplow and Shavell conclude that a rule of taxation is more efficient 
than a rule of tort in achieving a given equity-oriented distributive end.38 
For the concept of taxation and transfer to make sense, however, one 
requires an underlying or initial conception of entitlement. Similarly, the 
concepts of injury and redress, the frequent subject of tort doctrine, 
require the construction of initial entitlement baselines. The question 
then naturally arises: should such entitlement baselines be set in 
conformity with the “wealth-maximization” demand, regardless of the 
aims of the overall scheme? If Kaplow and Shavell understand such 
entitlement baselines to be among what they describe as “other” non-tax 
and transfer “legal rules,”39 then the answer is yes. Alternatively, should 
such entitlement baselines be set so as to directly achieve any given 
distributional goals in the first instance? Kaplow and Shavell’s 
comparison of tax and tort rules fails to address this fundamental 
question of entitlement. 
All political and legal institutions are constructed by legal rules. 
Kaplow and Shavell’s discussion isolates a particular subset of legal rules 
(namely, the rules of income taxation and transfer), and contrasts their 
efficiency in achieving equity-oriented distributive aims with the private 
law rules of tort. Their argument considers such tort rules one at a time, 
much like the way in which a court, while deciding individual cases, 
might consider crafting a legal rule. Kaplow and Shavell directly address 
rules involving negligence or other risk, and they appear to presume their 
argument can be adapted to extend to other rules (such as minimum 
wage laws).40 However, Kaplow and Shavell never address the general 
case. Further, they are silent about the form property rules, which 
necessarily underlie their analysis take; thereby introducing significant 
ambiguity. 
Kaplow and Shavell claim that “[f]or purposes of [their argument], 
the term ‘legal rules’ refers to rules other than those that define the 
 
 38. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 667.  
 39. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 667 n.1. 
 40. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 674 n.10. 
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income tax and welfare system.”41 They understand the term non-tax and 
transfer “legal rules” broadly. The very rules that inform or constitute 
taxation, that is, rules of property and entitlement, are therefore to be 
understood as among “all other legal rules.”42 Their discussion of income 
taxation, analytically speaking, takes place against the background of this 
constitutive set of legal rules that defines the details of property 
ownership. 
Our concern is the very question of the form that entitlement rules 
that define and inform their discussion of tort or tax are to take. An 
argument that compares taxation to a rule of tort, isolated from any 
conception of entitlement, and concludes that tax and transfer is superior 
to all other legal rules in terms of its economic efficiency, is incomplete. 
Our point is that Kaplow and Shavell’s argument requires, and turns 
upon, a conception of property. Kaplow and Shavell’s contrast, therefore, 
cannot be limited to a comparison of the rules of tort and the rules of tax 
and transfer. Since it is clear that legal rules construct the background of 
property ownership and markets that form the very basis of Kaplow and 
Shavell’s discussion of tort and tax, what their claim requires is an 
efficiency comparison of competing sets of property entitlement rules, in 
conjunction with a change in the rules of income taxation and transfer. 
In other words, in order to draw Kaplow and Shavell’s conclusion, what 
is required is not the singular comparison of rules of tort with rules of 
income taxation, but rather the comparison of complete schemes of rules, 
inclusive of entitlement, income taxation, and tort. 
II.  KAPLOW AND SHAVELL AND POSSIBLE PROPERTY CONCEPTIONS 
While it is clear that, for Kaplow and Shavell, property and rules of 
entitlement lie under the rubric of non-tax and transfer legal rules, it is 
not clear from their discussion which of many forms these rules should 
take. Kaplow and Shavell directly discuss constructing the rules of tort in 
service to the wealth maximization principle, but their discussion of 
income taxation and tort also requires an account of basic entitlement.43 
It would appear that there are two plausible property conceptions open 
to Kaplow and Shavell. First, they may simply believe that the majority 
of property rules are to be understood in a conventional manner, 
meaning their analysis may simply take the set of specific property rules 
of any legal system as given. In other words, one possible position is that 
given any actual system of property law, income taxation and transfer 
 
 41. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 667 n.1. 
 42. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 667 n.1.  
 43. Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient, supra note 9, at 672.  
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can more efficiently achieve an equity-oriented end than can the rules of 
tort.  
Second, Kaplow and Shavell might believe that, while a narrow 
range of basic entitlements should be constructed by the demands of 
non-wealth-maximizing values, the remaining, expansive domain of 
property law should be governed by the wealth maximization principle. 
There is significant support in Kaplow and Shavell’s own work (as well as 
in the law and economics literature, more generally44) of the view that 
the wealth maximization principle should not properly be understood to 
apply to the entirety of property and entitlement, even in the context of a 
scheme of legal rules otherwise aimed at wealth maximization. This 
position, now dominant in the law and economics literature, may help 
explain Kaplow and Shavell’s omission of a direct discussion of property 
in their analysis of legal rules. Kaplow and Shavell, as well as many other 
law and economics scholars (that is, wealth-maximizing theorists), have 
been drawn to a less-than-general conception of the wealth maximization 
principle, one which specifically exempts “basic entitlement” from its 
domain, such as those entitlements typically understood as fundamental 
constitutional rights, self-ownership, and security in one’s person. These 
limitations arise for a variety of reasons: some pragmatic, others 
conceptual and normative. This view holds that any expansive or detailed 
account of property rules must, in conjunction with all other rules (other 
than those of income taxation and transfer), be constructed in service to 
the wealth maximization principle, while leaving the details of more basic 
entitlements subject to some other values. In the next section of this 
Article, we will address the important ramifications and difficulties that 
the application of either of these two property conceptions have for 
Kaplow and Shavell’s claim. 
 
 44. Kaplow and Shavell, for example, concede that wealth-maximization is not a principle for 
general application and that distributive concerns may be appropriately applied in certain settings. 
They write, “there are sound reasons for much normative economic analysis of law not to take explicit 
account of the distribution of income . . . If these reasons are inapplicable in a particular setting, a 
proper welfare economic analysis will take distributional concerns exogenous to wealth maximization 
itself, adding “to compute wealth, one must know the prices of into account.” FAIRNESS VERSUS 
WELFARE, supra note 9, at 35. They write, “wealth—and thus wealth maximization—is not a well-
defined concept,” and, seemingly recognizing the necessity of a property baseline different goods and 
services, yet there is no natural set of prices to use.” Supra note 9, 35–36. Kaplow and Shavell then go 
on to discuss Richard Posner’s view of one such setting in which the wealth maximization principle 
ought not to apply—namely, initial property arrangements. Id. at 35–36 n.41 (quoting Posner, “stating 
‘I concede the incompleteness of “wealth” [because] the concept of wealth is dependent on the 
assignment of property rights.’”). 
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A. THE CONVENTIONALIST VIEW OF PROPERTY 
Again, the first possible understanding of Kaplow and Shavell’s view 
is that a significant portion of property is simply understood as 
conventional or given.45 Their claim might be understood to say that, for 
whatever property regime is in place, any equity-oriented distributional 
demand of that system can most efficiently be met through income 
taxation and transfer, compared to other non-property legal rules. Their 
advice, then, for purposes of institutional design, would be that in order 
to efficiently achieve a given equitable aim, the only legal doctrine one 
should manipulate is the income tax rate. In this view, their analysis takes 
as given that property arrangements are simply held constant. 
As we have seen, there are reasons for narrowing the scope of the 
wealth maximization principle so as to exclude many property 
entitlements from its domain. Scholars have at times maintained that the 
wealth maximization imperative is best understood as incomplete as 
opposed to being a foundational or general normative principle.46 Under 
this view, wealth maximization does not construct the complete scheme 
of basic entitlements. Given the need for a property conception, this may, 
then, yield the conclusion that, for Kaplow and Shavell, property 
entitlements are to be best understood conventionally, or simply as 
given. 
However, consider the ramifications that such an approach would 
have for Kaplow and Shavell’s claim. If property rules are to be 
understood conventionally (that is, taken as one finds them in any given 
system), then many inexpensive possibilities for maximizing the position 
of the least economically advantaged may be ignored. Kaplow and 
Shavell’s conclusion that equity-oriented moves are always more 
efficiently made in tax and transfer as opposed to all other legal rules thus 
appears to be significantly problematic. 
To clarify this point, consider a distributive principle which 
demands the maximization of the position of the least well-off.47 Imagine 
 
 45. Ezra Rosser, Destabilizing Property, 48 CONN. L. REV. 397, 471 (2015) (discussing the 
conventional view of property and how alterations in property entitlement might improve the  
well-being of the poor). 
 46. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 375 (1990); FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE, 
supra note 9, at 35 n.41. 
 47. Rawls famously describes the “difference principle” component of his two principles of justice 
as requiring the maximization of the position of the least well-off, subject to lexically prior basic 
liberties and equality of opportunity. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 42–43 (Erin 
Kelly ed., 2001): 
(A) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic 
liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; and (B) 
Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached 
to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and 
BLANKFEIN-69.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/22/17  12:40 AM 
December 2017]       THE PRIORITY OF INCOME TAXATION AND TRANSFER 15 
 
that the least well-off own rural land that is nearly valueless, given 
currently overbroad environmental rules and regulations. If these 
regulations were relaxed, the least well-off would be able to sell this land 
for development as a recreational area, perhaps for substantial economic 
gain. Given that the environmental regulations are, by stipulation, 
overbroad, significant income could be realized by the least well-off at 
little cost. The alternative to such a property law rearrangement would 
be taxing the wealthy, then transferring the proceeds to the least well-off. 
Here, it would seem the income taxation and transfer alternative would, 
in contravention to Kaplow and Shavell’s claim, impose a greater cost 
through the deadweight loss associated with income taxation than would 
shifting the overbroad environmental property rules. In short, the latter 
is more efficient to the goals of the scheme. This is particularly true given 
the value that could be “unlocked” with a shift away from conventional, 
but highly inefficient, property rules.48 
The point is that if Kaplow and Shavell assume that significant 
entitlements in property should be taken as they are found in any actual 
legal system, then their claim ought to be narrowed so as to specifically 
exclude property law from “other legal rules.” Otherwise, the claim 
appears to be false. If their claim of tax and transfer preference over 
“other legal rules” were so narrowed to exclude property, then given the 
ability of property entitlements to unlock large amounts of value, the 
import of the claim is significantly reduced. That said, there is little 
reason to believe that all property-oriented rules ought to remain entirely 
beyond the scope of legal regulation. For instance, consider the very 
purpose of takings cases, which alter property holdings in keeping with 
distributive aims. 
To make this point plain, consider the implication of this narrow 
conventionalist view if one were to compare complete schemes of legal 
and political rules constructed in service to differential distributive 
principles, for example, changing a wealth maximization scheme to a 
more egalitarian scheme committed to maximizing the position of the 
least well-off. The Kaplow and Shavell position on how best to change the 
rules of the scheme, given the new distributive principle, would be, of 
course, to alter only income taxation and transfer to satisfy the new, more 
equity-oriented principle. If, as we are assuming, one is to take the rules 
of property entitlement as they are found, this would imply that no 
change in property entitlements should occur. Our insight, however, 
 
second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society (the 
difference principle). 
 48. See, e.g., Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs, in THE WEST 
AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 49–50 (2000) (discussing important role of property titling as improving 
position of urban poor by making borrowing possible). 
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amounts to the claim that a change in the overall distributive goal of the 
scheme necessitates that all the rules of the new scheme are to be 
constructed so as to maximize the position of the least well-off. 
To conclude, Kaplow and Shavell’s claim, broadly understood, 
cannot be true if the rules of property are not set in accordance with 
distributive principles; setting property rules according to norms other 
than wealth maximization or working from the property rules in a 
“conventional” legal setting would be sufficient to show the over-breadth 
of their claim. Still, the problem with holding “property” as conventional 
goes deeper: If one is to “freeze” property entitlements as they are found 
in existing legal regimes, it is not clear what Kaplow and Shavell are 
comparing when they measure the relative “distortion” involved in 
implementing a rule of “income taxation” versus a rule of “tort” to achieve 
a given distributive end.49 Both tax and tort significantly impact 
entitlements. For example, my entitlement right in my automobile is 
relatively stronger when the income I generate from collecting taxicab 
fares is untaxed versus when it is taxed, and when third parties are liable 
for damaging it versus when they are entitled to damage it in certain 
circumstances without liability. So if my entitlement in my automobile is 
to be held constant in a conventional sense, it would appear that altering 
any relevant rules of taxation and of tort would also be blocked. In short, 
it appears that if Kaplow and Shavell mean to take property entitlements 
as fixed or given, their claim is incoherent. They must, then, have in mind 
that at least much of property law is to be set to or in some measure 
answer to wealth maximization and not be taken as conventionally given 
by any actual legal system. 
B. BASIC ENTITLEMENTS AND A WEALTH-MAXIMIZING PROPERTY REGIME 
The question of what exactly a wealth-maximizing property law 
scheme looks like is, itself, problematic. Even if most of what is 
doctrinally labeled as “property law” is subjected to wealth maximization, 
scholars have drawn attention to pragmatic, conceptual, and normative 
reasons that would seem to require a narrowing of the scope of the wealth 
maximization principle, such that it would not encompass all property 
entitlements. Specifically, scholars in the law and economics vein have 
been drawn to a constrained conception of the wealth maximization 
principle. Many scholars hold that the very concept of “wealth” is 
incomplete.50 That is, in order to evaluate prices or discern economic 
 
 49. Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient, supra note 9, at 674.  
 50. Richard Posner has emphasized “that wealth maximization is inherently incomplete as a 
guide to social action because it has nothing to say about the distribution of rights¾or at least nothing 
we want to hear . . . . If wealth maximization is indifferent to the initial distribution of rights, it is a 
truncated concept of justice.” POSNER, supra note 46, at 375. 
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value, one must first set entitlement baselines.51 Such baselines must be 
established, conceptually, prior to the very concept of wealth and, thus, 
the wealth maximization principle. The idea is that it would be illogical 
to speak of wealth absent an initial assignment of property rights; and if 
this is correct, the wealth maximization principle cannot govern such 
arrangements, making any such argument incoherent.52 
Although these conceptual reasons tend to be grouped among or 
alongside the normative reasons for the rejection of the wealth 
maximization principle as a guide to the construction of property and 
entitlement rules in the literature, they are actually distinct. That is, even 
if one were to show that this baseline problem could be overcome¾say, 
by assigning initial entitlements to those who will make the most of them 
and measuring wealth on an objective index¾there still would be strong 
normative reasons for rejecting the notion that wealth maximization 
should govern the entire assignment of property entitlements. Even if the 
economic analysis of law could produce a wealth-maximizing conception 
of property which does not fall prey to conceptual incoherence, wealth 
maximization scholars have concluded that one still needs to show that a 
“through and through” wealth-maximizing conception of property would 
be normatively acceptable. 
Indeed, in the context of significant debate, some law and economics 
scholars have maintained that applying the wealth-maximization 
principle to the most basic of property entitlements is objectionable on 
normative grounds. They argue that it may well produce or even demand 
normatively unacceptable (deeply illiberal) outcomes.53 The idea is that 
conceptions of freedom and equality, self-ownership of one’s body, labor, 
thought and conscience, dignitary interests, personal property and a 
basic or decent social minimum require property baselines defended on 
grounds other than wealth-maximization. Wealth maximization, given 
its aim of maximal net aggregate wealth, is consistent with, and may even 
 
 51. Lewis A. Kornhauser, Wealth Maximization, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 679 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Mark A. Geistfeld, Due Process and the 
Determination of Pain and Suffering Tort Damages, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 331, 349 n.65 (2006) (“The 
appropriate baseline cannot be determined by economic analysis, since cost-benefit analysis depends 
on prices which in turn depend on the initial allocation of property rights . . . . The initial allocation of 
property rights must instead depend upon [other] normative justification, and so the normatively 
justified tort rule defines the appropriate baseline for evaluating the distributive impact.”); FAIRNESS 
VERSUS WELFARE, supra note 9, at 36. 
 52. See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE (2002). 
 53. “Given the distribution of rights (whatever it is), wealth maximization can be used to derive 
the policies that will maximize the value of those rights. But this does not go far enough, because 
naturally we are curious about whether it would be just to start off with a society in which, say, one 
member owned all the others.” POSNER, supra note 46, at 375. 
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demand, troublingly illiberal property arrangements, including but not 
limited to, as Rawls points out, chattel slavery.54 
The basic idea here is that wealth maximization, like utilitarianism, 
fails to seriously consider the moral distinction between persons. 
Interestingly, it is the recognition of this point that leads Rawls to develop 
a theory of basic liberties and their priority to economic arrangements.55 
Law and economics scholars typically resolve this problem by narrowing 
the scope of the wealth maximization principle, requiring that  
non-wealth-maximizing values are at play in defining a narrow set of 
basic entitlements, thereby ultimately accepting what might be described 
as constrained wealth maximization.56 There are, then, good reasons to 
believe that Kaplow and Shavell do not hold that all property 
arrangements are to be subject to the wealth maximization principle. 
Instead, it would appear that they hold that some narrow class of basic 
property entitlements are to be directly set via  
non-wealth-maximizing (that is, equity-oriented) values, leaving the rest 
of property law to be governed by wealth maximization. 
A normative requirement that some basic entitlements reflect 
equity-oriented values is the rejection of a thoroughgoing wealth 
maximization in favor of a more equity-oriented, constrained  
wealth-maximizing principle. That is, the wealth maximization principle 
is abandoned in favor of suffusing basic entitlements with distinct, and 
more importantly, equity-oriented values. In favoring a more  
equity-oriented conception, Kaplow and Shavell appear not to hold that 
all equity-oriented moves are to be made in tax and transfer, but would 
 
 54. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 8. 
 55. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 243–44; JOHN RAWLS, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 291 (1993). For similar points, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
(1977); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 958 (1982) (discussing 
“strand of liberal property theory that focuses on personal embodiment or self-constitution in terms 
of ‘things.’”); Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 
227 (1980). 
 56. POSNER, supra note 46; FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE, supra note 9, at 35 n.41, 35–37. Indeed, 
a commitment to “constrained wealth maximization” may be more complicated than it initially 
appears. The range of values that motive a constraint on wealth maximization may not be so easily 
placed to one side or “cabined-off” to a few basic property entitlements such as self-ownership, thereby 
leaving the wealth maximization principle otherwise free to operate. Consider for example, defamation 
law, conventionally understood as a rule of tort law. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to 
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890) (discussing common law of defamation). On the plausible 
assumption that the same values that cause one to reject the possibility of (wealth-maximizing) chattel 
slavery may to require some measure of protection from defamation that might not be constructed 
under wealth maximization, the basic entitlement scheme might thus intrude into tort law itself, which 
would then be, importantly, in part non wealth-maximizing. For the sake of argument, however, we 
will proceed as if basic entitlements only involve a few rules of property law, as appears to be Kaplow 
and Shavell’s position. 
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instead include some such moves in the basic entitlement component of 
property law rules. 
Given that, as we have argued above, Kaplow and Shavell’s claim 
cannot be correct if it posits that property should be taken as merely 
conventional, it would seem that they hold that the non-basic aspects of 
entitlement should respond to the same maximand as does, for example, 
tort¾namely, wealth maximization. Since Kaplow and Shavell, to their 
credit, have noted the deeply problematic nature of extending the range 
of the wealth maximization principle to cover basic entitlements (which, 
as we have said, would call into question the status of self-ownership, 
freedom of conscience, and constitutional essentials), they place these 
matters under the control of non-wealth-maximizing, equity-oriented 
values.57 With these basic matters left to one side, Kaplow and Shavell 
thus hold a “constrained wealth-maximizing” view of property: legal 
rules of basic entitlement are governed by non-wealth-maximizing 
values, while all other (non-tax and transfer) legal rules are to be 
constructed by appeal to wealth maximization. In this constrained 
wealth-maximizing view, conventional or “positive” accounts of property 
are rejected and the expansive or non-basic rules of property are 
constructed in service to the wealth maximization principle.58 
Since Kaplow and Shavell themselves take as given that some  
non-tax and transfer legal rules¾those of basic entitlement¾are to be 
constructed in an equity-oriented fashion, their bold conclusion assumes 
that some equity-oriented moves must be made in the basic entitlement 
component of property law construction. For example, if a particular set 
of rules governing minimum wage is demanded or required of any 
entitlement scheme that sufficiently protects human dignity, it could be, 
in Kaplow and Shavell’s view, justified on exogenous moral (as opposed 
to efficiency grounds) since efficiency by their own lights has already 
been determined not to be the controlling value in the construction of 
rules governing basic entitlement. The existence of equity-oriented 
values in the construction of basic entitlements reduces the scope of 
Kaplow and Shavell’s claim. The efficiency preference of “tax and 
transfer” over “other legal rules” is then limited in range, applying only 
to what we have called non-basic entitlement. Given the conceptual and 
 
 57. FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE, supra note 9, at 35–37.  
 58. Note that the basic entitlements adopted as the constraints to a plausible theory of wealth 
maximization might not remain unchanged if a new distributive principle were to be implemented. If 
such a change in the distributive principle necessitated a change in basic entitlements, then this alone 
would be sufficient to refute Kaplow and Shavell’s thesis regarding the tax and transfer preference. In 
other words, if the “wealth maximization” basic entitlement package is not maximally efficient at 
satisfying a new, more equity-oriented distributive principle, then adoption of such a principle 
requires changes in property entitlement. 
 
BLANKFEIN-69.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/22/17  12:40 AM 
20 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1 
 
normative difficulty with a thoroughgoing wealth maximization 
approach to property, difficulties that Kaplow and Shavell themselves 
accept, any broader claim is problematic. However, Kaplow and Shavell 
may reasonably advance a narrower claim of an efficiency preference for 
tax and transfer over all non-basic entitlement legal rules, including the 
expansive rules of property law. We will argue, however, that there are 
conclusive reasons which demonstrate that the narrow claim that income 
taxation and transfer is more efficient in meeting equity-oriented 
demands than changes to an expansive property law regime is false, and 
should therefore be rejected. 
To summarize our argument, we have noted that Kaplow and 
Shavell leave the role of property law unattended in making their claim 
that income taxation and transfer are superior to “all other legal rules” in 
attaining equity-oriented goals. One is left to guess what their conception 
of property may be. We reject the possibility that they hold either a 
conventional view or a thoroughgoing wealth-maximization view (see 
chart below, first row) and conclude that they must hold a constrained 
wealth-maximization view. In this view, basic entitlements are set by 
equity-oriented values, but expansive property law constructions are 
governed by the wealth maximization principle (see chart below, second 
row). Since what is essential to a thoroughgoing refutation of Kaplow and 
Shavell’s thesis is showing that, as a matter of efficiency (that is, 
independent of moral reasons), equity-oriented moves are sometimes 
more cheaply made through the rules of expansive property law rather 
than through income taxation and transfer (see chart below, third row), 
we turn to this issue in the next section. 
 
 Property Law: Basic Entitlements 
Property Law: 
Expansive 
Constructions 
Distributive 
Principle: Wealth 
Maximization 
Objectionable Wealth Maximization 
Distributive 
Principle: 
Constrained Wealth 
Maximization 
Equity-Oriented Wealth Maximization 
Distributive 
Principle: Difference 
Principle 
Equity-Oriented 
K and S claim: Wealth 
Maximization; this 
claim we refute. 
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III.  THE PROPERTY LAW REFUTATION OF THE  
TAX AND TRANSFER PREFERENCE 
A. PROPERTY LAW AND DIFFERING DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES 
Different forms of liberalism feature different levels of commitment 
to the central liberal values of freedom and equality. In order to illustrate 
how legal rules are constructed under different conceptions of liberalism, 
let us turn to several examples. 
First consider Kaplow and Shavell’s constrained wealth-maximizing 
conception. With such a distributive principle, the rules of the complete 
scheme of economic institutions are to be arranged instrumentally so as 
to maximize net aggregate wealth, subject to the basic entitlement 
constraints (or range limitation). The rules of this arrangement of 
economic institutions are constructed in service to the over-arching 
demands of the distributive end: constrained wealth maximization. 
It is important to emphasize that, even within the context of such a 
wealth-oriented scheme of legal and political institutions, not all rules 
are to be constructed in a way that patterns a “free market” as would be 
found in Lockean-libertarianism or in the doctrine of laissez-faire.59 To 
be clear, wealth maximization and the doctrine of laissez-faire are not the 
same¾in the context of constrained wealth maximization, there is no 
principled commitment to values such as near-absolute rights in 
holdings and transfer as would be found in a libertarian scheme. 
Constrained wealth maximization likely requires some “collectivist” or 
state ownership. 
For example, consider a scheme of legal institutions in which air 
travel has recently been introduced. The assumptions behind the Coase 
Theorem,60 of course, would not apply to transactions between airplane 
owners and numerous landowners, due to bargaining costs and the 
possibility of strategic holdout. But this is not our present concern. 
Property rights allowing airplanes to fly overhead might be more 
valuably assigned to airlines, given a wealth-maximizing property 
scheme, than being left to the discretion of would-be libertarian holders 
of fees simple absolute. If this were indeed the case then subsequent to 
the introduction of the airplane, wealth-maximizing private law rules 
 
 59. ROBERT A. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). 
 60. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). The assumptions of the 
Coase Theorem include no wealth effects and no transactions or bargaining costs. Elizabeth Hoffman 
& Matthew L. Spitzer, Experimental Law and Economics: An Introduction, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 
1010 (1985). 
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would presumably (1) reduce the ad coelum rights61 of landowners from 
the baseline of libertarianism, that is, shave down fees simple absolute 
and assign air rights to airlines, (2) change the landowners’ property-rule 
protection as against airborne incursions to liability rule protection,62 or 
(3) “collectivize” air-rights, with the new government owner allowing 
openaccess to airplane owners or perhaps charging a relatively small 
usage fee.63 
Where the reassignment of property rights “unlocks” net aggregate 
wealth, it is required within a set of legal and economic institutions 
aimed at wealth maximization, independent of the question of 
transaction costs. Once one accepts Kaplow and Shavell’s constrained 
wealth maximization principle, there can be no reasonable objection to 
the details of this change in property entitlement¾the only real objection 
would be to the constrained wealth maximization principle itself, not to 
its instantiation in this particular instance in which private property 
rights were reduced.64 Our point is that differential governing 
distributive principles demand differential property conceptions¾for 
example, the move from Lockean-libertarianism to wealth maximization. 
As a further example, stipulate that the construction of a public park 
in a growing city would be wealth-maximizing; however, the city’s 
attempt to secure a suitable plot of land is hampered by a small group of 
would-be libertarians refusing to sell land to the city. Constrained wealth 
 
 61. For hundreds of years, the common law dictum of cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum 
et ad infernos, or “To whomever the soil belong, he owns also to the sky and to the depths” gave 
unlimited air-rights to landowners. Ad coelum et ad infernos, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). 
 62. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
 63. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (“[The] ad coelum . . . . doctrine has no 
place in the modern world. The air is a public highway . . . . Were that not true, every transcontinental 
flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To 
recognize such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways [and] seriously interfere with 
their control and development in the public interest”); Lord Bernstein of Leigh v. Skyviews & Gen. 
Ltd., n.5 [1978] QB 479 (Eng.):  
[t]he maxim, usque ad coelum, [is] a fanciful phrase, to which I would add that if applied 
literally it is a fanciful notion leading to the absurdity of a trespass at common law being 
committed by a satellite every time it passes over a suburban garden. The academic writers 
speak with one voice in rejecting the uncritical and literal application of the maxim . . . . I 
accept their collective approach as correct. The problem is to balance the rights of an owner 
to enjoy the use of his land against the rights of the general public to take advantage of all 
that science now offers in the use of air space. This balance is in my judgment best struck in 
our present society by restricting the rights of an owner in the air space above his land to 
such height as is necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of his land and the structures 
upon it, and declaring that above that height he has no greater rights in the air space than 
any other member of the public. 
 64. Murphy & Nagel, supra note 52, at 98; Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax 
Expenditure Budgets: A Critical View, 54 TAX NOTES 1661, 1663 (1992) (arguing that there are no fixed 
baselines in taxation: “The choice among perspectives is a contestable, contingent . . . decision.”). 
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maximization, here, might be satisfied by altering these property owners’ 
rights¾from, for example, property-rule protection to liability-rule 
protection¾thus allowing the city to engage in a “taking” of the land and 
requiring the provision of fair market compensation. So, to be clear, 
constrained wealth maximization might require that the scheme reassign 
property rights in a “collectivist” manner in order to increase wealth. 
These examples show that a commitment to a constrained wealth 
maximization principle has a significant effect on the form that 
entitlements in property take (that is, the proverbial “bundle of sticks”). 
The point is that commitment to the constrained wealth maximization 
principle requires that property entitlements be constructed in service to 
its demands. The idea, not a transaction cost story, is that one cannot 
succeed in meeting the demands of constrained wealth maximization by 
simply adjusting the rules of income taxation and transfer in a direction 
more conducive to economic growth, without attention to property 
entitlements. 
Instead, one would need to construct the rules in conjunction with 
one another, so as to produce a complete scheme of legal and economic 
institutions that complies with the distributive goal: constrained wealth 
maximization. The principle requires an optimal set of property rights 
and entitlements, just as it requires an optimal rate of taxation; 
importantly, the tax rate in a scheme of legal and political rules governed 
by constrained wealth maximization is not zero. 
In significant contrast to constrained wealth maximization, consider 
a form of liberal egalitarianism that subscribes to Rawls’s “difference 
principle,” which demands that the rules of all economic and legal 
institutions be arranged so as to maximize the position of the least  
well-off, subject to satisfying the lexically prior first principle of justice 
and equal opportunity.65 Rawlsianism, of course, measures the position 
of the least well-off not in terms of wealth, but by counting what Rawls 
calls the objective index of the “primary goods.”66 Importantly, this 
means that Kaplow and Shavell’s claim does not, given their 
assumptions, apply to Rawlsianism. However, as is often done for 
illustrative purposes,67 consider a quasi-Rawlsian approach that seeks to 
maximize the position of the least well-off in terms of dollars which, for 
the moment, complies with Kaplow and Shavell’s idealizations which are 
distinct from Rawls’s. Such a liberal egalitarian approach is analogous to 
constrained wealth maximization in that it is instrumentalist and 
 
 65. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 75. 
 66. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 90. 
 67. E.g., THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 66 (1989) (“Let me give a crude illustration of 
Rawls’s position, based, once again, upon his difference principle in its simplest form (where it governs 
only income).”). 
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maximizing (subject to the first principle of justice and equal 
opportunity) with regard to the rules of a complete set of economic 
institutions, inclusive of expansive property conceptions, contract, 
property, tort, corporate, bankruptcy, and commercial law.68 
As in the constrained wealth maximization case, then, here too we 
are required to meet the demands of a maximizing principle¾in this 
case, one focused on the position of the least well-off. For reasons of 
equality, this principle, unlike the wealth maximization principle which 
focuses on net aggregate wealth, requires that the position of the least 
well-off be maximized. From a wealth maximization perspective, the 
difference principle is significantly more equity-oriented and, again, the 
rules of the economic scheme are to be constructed in service to its 
maximizing demands. So, as in the wealth maximization example,  
non-tax and transfer legal rules are constructed, instrumentally and in 
conjunction with one another, in service to the new equity-oriented 
difference principle. Changing the maximand from focusing on net 
aggregate wealth to focusing on the wealth of the position of the least 
well-off should require property law to be employed instrumentally in the 
direct satisfaction of the scheme’s demands. More precisely, Kaplow and 
Shavell hold that in order to meet the demands of the newly governing 
difference principle, the expansive rules of property law should be 
constructed so as to maximize wealth¾that is, remain constant in an 
inter-schemic comparison despite the change in the distributive principle 
that governs the entire scheme of legal and economic rules. For Kaplow 
and Shavell, only the rate of income taxation and its inverse, the transfer 
rate, changes. 
The setting of initial property entitlements can have significant 
effects on the achievement of the desired ends of an economic scheme.69 
Consider again the park example: imagine a complete scheme of legal 
and economic rules in which the position of the least well-off would be 
improved considerably by adding a park to a crowded neighborhood. 
While there might be holdouts or other collective action problems 
attendant to acquiring property for the park through voluntary contract, 
our point goes deeper. A scheme of property rules focused on maximizing 
the position of the least well-off might, then, assign the plot or the right 
to purchase it for an objectively determined price to the state, even in the 
absence of transaction costs. This would be an equity-oriented rule of 
 
 68. See Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Rawls and Contract Law, 73 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 598, 609 (2005). 
 69. Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to 
Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553 (1993); Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 
351 (1991). 
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property law, and it would be adopted because it maximizes the position 
of the least well-off. 
This example demonstrates that property law constructions remain, 
in a scheme responding to the difference principle, instrumental to the 
service of that principle. Kaplow and Shavell’s claim is that the 
satisfaction of the new maximand can be most efficiently achieved by 
having the expansive rules of property law ignore the switch in 
maximands. That is, the expansive rules of property law are to continue 
to respond to a different maximizing distributive principle: One focused 
exclusively on net aggregate wealth. Consider, however, the implication 
of constructing private law rules so as to maximize net aggregate wealth 
in a system subject to the maximizing demands of the difference 
principle. The expansive rules of property law function to maximize net 
aggregate wealth regardless of their effect on the actual goal of the 
overall scheme, which is to maximize the position of the least well-off. 
Put this way, the claim is highly counterintuitive: Kaplow and Shavell 
would hold that in order to maximize the position of the least well-off, 
one is best advised to start by maximizing wealth, making all changes 
through income taxation and transfer. 
So, property assignments must answer to the demands of the 
maximand, which may require certain specified entitlement 
assignments. While these assignments might at times solve transaction 
cost problems, this is decidedly not our principal point. Assignments 
might overcome subjective preferences in order to satisfy the maximand. 
Consider a newly developed drone technology that allows low-cost 
delivery of pharmaceuticals to underserved neighborhoods. A maximand 
that focuses on the position of the least well-off might demand that 
drones be able to establish flight paths over wealthy neighborhoods even 
if wealthy residents had no interest in selling their air rights. The 
reassignment of air rights is not done to solve a transaction cost 
problem70¾instead it is done to satisfy a direct demand of the 
maximand¾to improve the position of the least well-off.71 
B. ANALYSIS OF THE TAX AND TRANSFER PREFERENCE 
It can now be demonstrated why Kaplow and Shavell’s tax and 
transfer preference is problematic. The expansive conception of property 
law, constructed so as to maximize net aggregate wealth would, by 
definition, instantiate a rule that increased net aggregate wealth by 0.5 
but which decreased the position of the least well-off by 100. In returning 
 
 70. Cf. Fennell & McAdams, supra note 21 at 1057. 
 71. Analogously, Rawlsian contract law would “close” certain options that would be “open” in 
wealth maximization. Kordana & Tabachnick, supra note 68, at 598. 
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to our initial example, this may mean constructing a property rule 
limiting public access to beaches that has the effect of increasing  
beach-front land values and, on net, slightly increasing overall wealth. 
However, such a rule comes at a cost to lower-income would-be 
beachgoers. This decrease in the position of the least well-off should, 
according to Kaplow and Shavell, be “undone” through income taxation 
and transfer, even given the latter’s attendant “distortion” of the  
labor-leisure trade-off and associated dead-weight loss. However, 
crucially, if the “loss” from this distortion (plus administrative and 
transactions costs) was greater than 0.5¾given that 100.5 is being 
sought to be taxed and transferred¾then the scheme would do better to 
have avoided adopting that particular wealth-maximizing property law. 
An economic scheme aimed at maximizing the position of the least well-
off should not “eke out” every last drop of wealth in its construction of 
property law. 
This example is sufficient to refute Kaplow and Shavell’s claim. The 
outcome, once the issue has been properly framed as involving the 
construction of a new scheme of legal and economic rules, subject to a 
new maximand, is not terribly surprising. Working at cross-purposes to 
an overarching maximizing principle (that is, the difference principle) by 
invoking the distinct wealth maximization principle, to govern what we 
have shown to be crucial expansive property constructions, seems an 
unlikely¾and curious¾way to maximize the position of the least  
well-off. We argue that, in a such a scheme governed by a new distributive 
principle, many property (re)arrangements that directly improve the 
position of the least well-off could be made at a lower cost than through 
the use of taxation and transfer¾largely by (re)constructing expansive 
property law rules that had been adopted in service to  
wealth-maximization but which can now be seen as extremely costly in 
terms of the satisfaction of the new, equity-oriented difference principle. 
It is significant that these costs or inefficiencies are “new”¾they are 
relevant only given the new distributive principle. A reduction in the 
position of the least well-off did not count against a rule under the wealth 
maximization principle, so long as net aggregate wealth was increased. 
Thus, for a given distributive principle, it is simply too “costly,” in 
terms of the aims of that principle, to construct a scheme of legal and 
economic rules by subjecting (large) portions of the scheme to a distinct 
maximand. A maximizing distributive principle, metaphorically 
speaking, “sucks the air out of the room.” That is, maximization requires, 
in principle, the construction of a complete set of legal and economic 
rules that ekes out every bit of value or benefit (however small) in terms 
of one distributive principle, to the exclusion of all others. It is far better, 
in terms of efficiency, to satisfy an overarching distributive scheme by 
constructing all parts of the system to be responsive to a distributive 
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principle, as opposed to another aim. In the presence of one maximizing 
distributive principle, there is simply no “air” in the system to sustain the 
demands of another competing maximizing principle. 
As our example demonstrates, setting expansive rules of property 
law to wealth-maximize when some other maximizing distributive 
principle is in place can be extremely costly, by dramatically increasing 
the amount of “redistribution” that needs to be done¾in a manner that 
can overwhelm whatever per-unit advantage (from the lack of a “double 
distortion”) that taxation may have over the private law in achieving, 
intra-schemically, a fixed amount of additional “equity.” 
This is not an insignificant point. It is true that where one’s global 
aim is the maximization of the least well-off, one must take care not to 
destroy the production of wealth. However, it does not follow from this 
mere cautionary instruction that all non-tax and transfer legal rules 
should be constructed instrumentally to an alternative maximand (that 
is, wealth maximization). The important lesson to learn from Kaplow and 
Shavell is that when tax and transfer can more efficiently distribute value 
to the least well-off than changes in other legal rules, it should be done. 
However, such a decision always requires further analysis of the cost of 
the imposition of wealth-maximizing legal rules upon the least well-off 
(in terms of their own wealth maximization) and the efficiency of 
compensating that loss via tax and transfer. It is clear that since various 
property assignments within a wealth-maximizing property scheme have 
a differential impact on net aggregate wealth, there is no reason a priori 
to believe that tax and transfer is more efficient than alterations to 
property rules. In any situation where a specific wealth-maximizing rule 
within the complete set of legal and economic institutions is contributing 
little real value to net aggregate wealth (meaning it creates little revenue 
for purposes of taxation) and at the same time serves to reduce the wealth 
of the least well-off, a deviation from the wealth-maximizing property 
rule will be more efficient than tax and transfer in maximizing the 
position of the least well-off. The continued imposition of such property 
rules would simply be operating in contravention to the goal of 
maximizing the position of the least well-off. 
C. COUNTER-EXAMPLE TO THE TAX AND TRANSFER PREFERENCE 
The effect of switching away from constrained wealth maximization 
on expansive property constructions illuminates an even greater 
difficulty with Kaplow and Shavell’s thesis than our discussion thus far 
has suggested. Consider the following example. In service to the demands 
of constrained wealth maximization, entitlement to a remote fishery has 
been assigned to F, a highly skilled fisherman who is its highest value 
owner and will use expensive equipment to harvest caviar from 
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sturgeon.72 Now assume that the difference principle has been put in 
place. Kaplow and Shavell would advise that one should maximize the 
position of the least well-off only through the use of income taxation and 
transfer, that is, only the income tax rate (and its inverse transfer rate) 
would change; all other legal rules would remain unchanged, in their 
constrained wealth maximization construction. Keep in mind, however, 
that we cannot assume that the fishery will continue to operate in the new 
scheme governed by the difference principle. When we shift the 
maximand from constrained wealth maximization to the difference 
principle we are, by definition, accepting less net aggregate wealth, or a 
smaller economic pie.73 The fact that net aggregate wealth decreases has 
an effect on prices within the scheme. For example, the relative price and 
proliferation of luxury goods may decline precipitously as compared to 
the price of basic commodities. Given this hypothesized drop in the price 
of luxury items like caviar, the remote caviar-fishery might best be 
abandoned in the new scheme, according to the difference principle’s 
demands. The economic activities that are constructed in the new scheme 
are different from those constructed in service to the demands of 
constrained wealth maximization. Luxurious mansions might need to be 
reconfigured into apartments for the least well-off. 
It is useful to recall a now-canonical example from property law 
scholarship. Demsetz famously argued that one should understand the 
transformation from communal holding of property to private land 
ownership among the Native Americans in northeastern Canada as a 
result of the increased value of furs once the Europeans arrived.74 As the 
value of fur increased, the cost of overhunting fur-bearing animals also 
increased.75 This made it suddenly cost-effective to bear the costs of 
private land-ownership (for example, demarcating and policing 
boundaries76), internalizing the externality of overhunting through 
communal ownership. The point is that the change in the relative price 
of fur necessitated a reconstruction of the bundle of property rights and 
entitlements. Another now-canonical example is the invention of barbed 
wire which lowered the cost of fencing, and spurred greater subdivision 
of land in the American West.77 So too we argue that the change in 
 
 72. This appears to be consistent with the assumptions of Kaplow and Shavell’s argument. 
“Individuals differ in their ability [alpha] to earn income y through labor effort.” Kaplow & Shavell, 
Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient, supra note 9, at 677. 
 73. See RAWLS, supra note 19, at 71 n.10 (“This fact is generally recognized in welfare economics, 
as when it is said that [wealth maximization] is to be balanced against equity.”). 
 74. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 356–58 (1967) 
(Papers and Proceedings). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1327–30 (1993). 
 77. Id. at 1330. 
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relative prices that will occur under a new maximand which has 
decreased net aggregate wealth will necessitate the reconstruction of 
property entitlements. 
The idea is this: if legal and economic institutions are arranged to 
maximize wealth, then they are, by definition, arranged such that assets 
are in the possession of the highest value user. Thus, such an 
arrangement marks the wealth-production ceiling. If expansive property 
entitlements are rearranged to maximize the position of the least well-off 
instead, the system incurs significant loss in net aggregate wealth, which 
cannot be preserved in the newly created property and entitlement 
scheme. Kaplow and Shavell would argue that the wealth created for the 
least well-off by any alternative property arrangement cannot be greater 
than the wealth created by the wealth-maximizing set of property 
arrangements, so one might as well use income tax and transfer in 
conjunction with wealth-maximizing property rules to maximize the 
position of the least well-off. One cannot switch between a wealth 
maximization regime and a scheme designed to maximize the position of 
the least well-off without significantly altering prices and economic 
activity. The economic activity available for taxation in a  
wealth-maximizing scheme is not necessarily available for similar 
taxation in a scheme arranged to maximize the position of the least well-
off. Thus, while a wealth-maximizing scheme requires assigning rights in 
the remote fishery to F, one cannot assume that F’s involvement in the 
production of a luxury item (caviar) would exist, and thus be available for 
similar treatment through taxation once property entitlements are 
instead set to maximize the position of the least well-off. 
Once taxation and property entitlements are set instrumentally to a 
“non-wealth-maximizing” demand, prices and economic activity cannot 
be held constant. When one adopts legal rules that aim to maximize the 
position of the least well-off, net aggregate wealth is self-consciously 
decreased in favor of a specific (more egalitarian) distributive pattern. 
This pattern, in turn, creates a new and distinct set of prices. Expansive 
property entitlements should not be held constant in drawing 
comparisons between complete legal and economic schemes. The 
continued assignment of property rights to the now-defunct, though 
previously profitable, remote fishery to F is clearly inefficient in 
maximizing the position of the least well-off. Such rights should instead 
be assigned to someone other than F, perhaps to a local group of  
less-skilled people, G, that can engage, for example, in subsistence 
fishing, which will in turn be more instrumental to satisfying the 
difference principle. Notice that this asset reassignment is required by 
the collapse in the caviar market, as compared to an attempt to impose 
taxation on a now nonexistent caviar fishery, if one is to satisfy the 
demands of the difference principle. 
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Thus, the entitlement to the fishery must change when the 
maximand has changed from wealth maximization to maximizing the 
position of the least well-off. This demonstrates that property rights and 
entitlements must be altered in order to most efficiently satisfy the 
demands of the new distributive principle. In a scheme governed by 
wealth maximization, the fishery is assigned to F. In a scheme governed 
by the difference principle, the fishery is instead assigned to G. In 
essence, the reassignment of the fishery to G creates more income than 
is taken from F. Thus, unlike a rule of income taxation or tort, which 
transfer dollars between individuals, the added (or, “double”) distortion 
of transferring property assignments can be positive in nature, such that 
it is more efficient to the ends of the new (non-wealth-maximizing) 
maximand than an equivalent taxing of F with associated transfer of 
dollars to G. 
Nevertheless, one might object that the fishery in this example has 
been, given the contingencies of the new scheme, assigned to its highest 
value user and therefore property law is best understood as remaining 
under the “governance” of wealth maximization. In this vein, consider 
the following: The fishery was assigned to G instead of another less 
talented local group, G2, which is notorious for its fear of the water. This 
assignment was made on the grounds that G would create more value by 
engaging in subsistence fishing than would G2, who would fish 
inefficiently due to their hydrophobia. This view, however, embodies a 
failure to properly understand wealth maximization. The objection 
appears to conflate an anti-waste dictum, or a mandate to meet the 
difference principle efficiently, with wealth maximization. Imagine F’s 
complaint against the new scheme. He complains that he has lost the 
entitlement to the fishery, and that this loss is objectionable because the 
new scheme fails to create property entitlements which maximize wealth. 
The administrators of the new scheme would likely reply that the fishery 
was reassigned in service to the difference principle, and the 
reassignment was justified in terms of that governing principle. It was 
made as a matter of the new, more equity-oriented commitment (an aim 
of the new system, but not of the previous system). The point, however, 
of F’s complaint is that the new arrangement fails to maximize wealth, 
and given his talents, he objects to his place in the new scheme. However, 
what has occurred is the reassignment of the fishery as a matter of 
efficiently serving the new maximand.78 
 
 78. Different distributive principles require that distinct steps be taken in order to be satisfied 
efficiently. See RAWLS, supra note 19, at 68 (“The principle of efficiency does not by itself select one 
particular distribution of commodities as the efficient one. To select among the efficient distributions 
some other principle, a principle of justice, say, is necessary.”). 
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In response to this objection, importantly, the reassignment of the 
fishery does not follow the pattern of wealth maximization.  
Wealth maximization would assign the fishery to the least well-off if and 
only if its value to the least well-off (L) was greater than its value to the 
most talented person(s) (M) within the new scheme. However, if one is 
seeking to satisfy the difference principle, it must be noted that if the 
asset is assigned to the most talented, with the least well-off being 
compensated via tax and transfer, the least well-off will benefit only by 
tiM, where ti is the optimal income tax rate (with an associated “transfer” 
rate of -ti) within the scheme that is applicable to that asset in the hands 
of the most talented. In other words, given optimal tax policy, not all of 
the value created by the assignment to the most talented is available to 
benefit the least well-off. Thus, the assignment of the asset must be given 
directly to the least well-off if L > tiM. To be clear, this is not the wealth 
maximization decision-rule, in which the assignment is to the least well 
off only if L > M. The objection cannot be sustained. 
Kaplow and Shavell appear to not fully recognize the fixed role that 
taxation and transfer must play in the context of maximizing schemes. 
Our concern is perhaps most readily understood in the context of 
constrained wealth maximization. Here, all non-basic legal and economic 
institutions should be set to maximize wealth—this must, of course, 
include the tax and transfer regime. To be clear, taxation in a wealth 
maximization scheme is not zero;79 in order to achieve wealth 
maximization, some tax revenue is needed, for example, for the creation 
of public goods.80 Taxation in a wealth-maximizing scheme is higher than 
it would be in the context of a political system designed to keep with the 
doctrine of laissez-faire or libertarianism, and (presumably) lower than 
it would be in the context of a Rawlsian distributive scheme maximizing 
the position of the least well-off. Our point is that in the context of wealth 
maximization, there is an optimal set of tax-policies, including optimal 
tax rates that are necessitated by the maximand. There simply is little 
“openness” in the context of a maximizing scheme for competing tax and 
transfer schemes; again, tax policy including the optimal rate of taxation 
is fixed by the maximand. If one is to maximize, it is crucial that all legal 
rules be constructed in a nonarbitrary and instrumentalist fashion. 
Zachary Liscow observes that, in the context of a wealth-maximizing 
regime, pollution levels will be the same under both a negligence and 
 
 79. See, e.g., Joel Slemrod, Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 157, 
172 (1990); cf. Matthew Dimick, Should the Law Do Anything About Economic Inequality?,  
26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 40 (2016) (“Since taxation can only reduce wealth, no taxation is 
justified under the utilitarian’s preferences.”). 
 80. See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954). 
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strict liability tort regime.81 He then argues that if one is interested in 
helping the poor, one should construct a strict liability regime, as that 
will not, compared to negligence, affect pollution levels and will result in 
more money in the hands of the poor. He describes this transfer as 
“costless.”82 
We have two objections. First, tort governs more than pollution 
levels. It also affects, for example, investment decisions and incentives. 
So, switching to strict liability, while it may not affect pollution levels, is 
not costless, as it likely upsets wealth maximization along a number of 
important dimensions, such as investment. 
Second, the true analysis of the Kaplow and Shavell claim needs to 
be inter-schemic, for example, between a full set of legal rules 
constructed so as to maximize wealth versus the position of the least  
well-off. His analysis does not account for the complete (re)arrangement 
of legal entitlements that may be required in the face of a new maximand. 
Instead he appears to assume the opposite: That in the context of a 
maximand, legal rules can be altered in a globally cost free manner 
(whatever the pollution level). Here, one must note that the factory may, 
in the Rawlsian scheme, disappear, pollute more or less, and change what 
counts as costs and benefits, and indeed as pollution. These are all 
defined in terms of the maximand. None of these changes are “free”; each 
is required in service of the new maximand, as deviations come at a cost. 
In the context of a wealth-maximizing system, Liscow argues that a 
factory would continue to pollute the same amount under both a 
negligence and strict liability tort regime.83 In light of this, he holds that 
money can be “costless[ly]” transferred to the poor via shifting tort 
liability from negligence to strict liability.84 While it is plausible, as he 
states, that factory owners are wealthier than those who live close to 
polluting factories, importantly, it is not clear why this change in tort law 
policy is “costless” from the perspective of wealth maximization. Tort 
policy affects more than pollution levels, and such levels, in and of 
themselves, are not the final aim of wealth maximization. As we have 
said, the comparison, properly understood, is inter-schemic: A system of 
legal rules constructed by wealth maximization on the one hand versus a 
system of legal rules constructed by equity-oriented principles (such as 
Rawls’s difference principle maximizing the position of the least well-off) 
on the other. The factory may be shut down entirely, or the substance of 
what is defined as pollution¾or baselines that determine what counts as 
 
 81. Zachary Liscow, Note, Reducing Inequality on the Cheap: When Legal Rule Design Should 
Incorporate Equity as Well as Efficiency, 123 YALE L.J. 2478, 2486 (2014). 
 82. Id. at 2487. 
 83. Id. at 2486 (assuming “factories do not shut down”). 
 84. Id. at 2487. 
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costs and benefits¾is likely to be altered in the new global  
equity-oriented scheme.85 
So the choice of tort policy is not “free,” as Liscow argues, but rather 
mandated or required by the new, equity-oriented maximand. The very 
quantum of pollution, the choice of tort liability and the value of the 
factory are determined by the overarching maximand, so as to maximize, 
say, the position of the least well-off. While it is true that a change in tort 
liability may or may not be required, and true that such assignments are 
properly “defined as distribution rather than redistribution” and perhaps 
“perfect” where assigned in keeping with the maximand, Liscow’s 
conclusion that such a change is “costless”86 simply does not follow. It 
transfers a sum of money from the factory’s owners¾thus lowering the 
value of the factory¾with all of its attendant distortions (from the 
perspective of wealth maximization). In other words, while it is true that 
torts are defined by the distributive scheme,87 and that such a 
 
 85. Kordana & Tabachnick, supra note 8, at 1300–01 n.54 (“[T]he details of any protections 
against economic harms the right against economic injury or harm are a function of property rules 
that provide the relevant … baseline” and “the specific details of rights of ownership, transfer, and 
compensation for harm require a property baseline … thus, economic aspects of the private law are … 
constructed in service to the maximizing demands of the difference principle.”); Kordana & 
Tabachnick, supra note 68, at 614–15:  
One might question a “reliance on taxation and transfer to satisfy the demands of the 
difference principle. It is not clear … that a Rawlsian must hold that the demands of the 
difference principle are best met entirely through a system of taxation and transfer. Assume 
for the sake of argument, as Rawls sometimes does, that the political institutions adopted 
to meet the demands of the difference principle will include a market economy and a system 
of private law. Assume further that the latter includes contract and tort law. It then is not 
clear why contract and tort law cannot be leveraged to help in meeting the demands of the 
difference principle. Political and legal institutions have complex and dynamic effects on 
one another. It thus seems unlikely that an economic scheme that maximizes the position 
of the least well-off would rely exclusively on tax and transfer for distribution. For example, 
the manner in which the rules of tort law function may have dramatic effects on the position 
of the least advantaged. To the extent that tort law is one of the means through which 
accidents are deterred and accident victims are compensated, it seems that it (in addition 
to tax) could be harnessed to meet the demands of the difference principle.  
Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012) (discussing the import 
of property baselines); Kahn & Lehman, supra note 64 (discussing entitlement baselines in the context 
of the tax expenditure budget). 
 86. Liscow, supra note 81, at 2487. 
 87. Kordana & Tabachnick, supra note 68, at 616–17 (There is no “reason for a Rawlsian to prefer 
the exclusive use of tax and transfer for the achievement of distributional aims” nor is it even possible 
to “distinguish between “taxation” and “other legal rules” . . . the very objects of taxation (for example, 
property and income) are themselves post-institutionally created and defined by legal rules,” 
distinctions “between property law, contract law, [tort law] and taxation . . . are blurred.” That is, “a 
Rawlsian might plausibly view the required remittance of fifty percent of one’s wages to the 
government as constituting “taxation” at a fifty-percent rate, but could also plausibly characterize that 
remittance as instantiating a “property” rule.”); Kordana & Tabachnick, supra note 8, at 1307 (“the 
rules of tort law are constructed by the principles of justice in conjunction with all other bodies of law 
so as to create a complete scheme of legal and political institution that is maximally instrumental to 
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construction can transfer assets to the disadvantaged, such transfer 
comes at a cost from the global wealth maximization perspective. 
Liscow’s analysis may be seen as myopically focused on the 
possibility of a “tie” in pollution levels when one compares strict liability 
with negligence. He moves from the fact of a tie in pollution levels to the 
conclusion that a change in private law rules is free. However, inter-
schemically, a good deal more is at stake than mere pollution levels. 
Unlike his belief, this is not only a distributive matter.88 Crucially, the 
selection of tort policy affects total wealth. While choice of tort policy may 
not alter pollution activity intra-schemically, it is not free. 
It appears that Liscow achieves a tie in pollution by holding crucial 
incentive effects of the competing schemes of legal rules constant, 
thereby inadvertently disabling the competing maximands. His example 
produces a tie with regard to pollution levels only, owing to the well 
understood, if counterintuitive, fact that, all else being constant, changes 
in private law rules cannot guarantee alteration in pollution activity 
levels. 
But, all else is not constant in the face of alternative maximands. 
Again, the proper analysis is between complete schemes of legal rules and 
their respective governing maximands. Tort policy aims to govern more 
than just pollution levels. It is also a mechanism of wealth creation and 
distribution and their many component parts: for example, investment 
decisions and spreading the costs of accidents. Since choice of tort policy 
is not free globally, Liscow has not demonstrated that alterations in 
private law rules are more efficient than income taxation and transfer in 
achieving equity oriented demands, as Kaplow and Shavell maintain. 
D. MAXIMIZING PRINCIPLES AND THE DEMAND FOR OPTIMAL TAX RATES 
Any assumption that tax and transfer can be “freely” invoked to 
bring the entire scheme of legal rules into compliance with the maximand 
is unwarranted. The point is that, in terms of the relentless demands of 
wealth maximization, any moves away from optimal taxation are not cost 
free. Such moves produce significant economic distortion which would 
prevent the entire scheme from maximizing. It is not the case that any 
failure to maximize wealth in expansive property law rules can simply be 
efficiently “compensated” through the use of tax and transfer by raising 
 
the demands of the principles of justice” and “principles of justice enjoin only the conclusion that the 
entire scheme best meets the demands of the principles of justice.”). 
 88. Liscow, supra note 81, at 2487 (“Although there is no difference in the behavior of the 
polluter, there is a difference in the distribution of money.”). 
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or lowering income taxation.89 If one is to maximize, all legal rules need 
to be set to wealth maximization, with significant attention to optimal tax 
policy; given the maximand, there is simply little latitude in this regard. 
Return now to the context of a system governed by the difference 
principle. Here, of course, the goal is not to create the greatest net 
aggregate wealth, but rather to maximize the size of the smallest 
distributive share, compared with all other possible schemes of legal and 
economic rules. Notably, there is no demand to maximize the net 
aggregate size of the total economic “pie”; indeed, the goal of maximizing 
the position of the least well-off is in significant conflict with the aim of 
maximizing net aggregate wealth, a goal which is indifferent to any 
distributive pattern. Nevertheless, taxation functions in an analogous 
fashion: given the maximand, there must be an optimal level of 
taxation.90 Again, tax policy, inclusive of tax rates, is not “open” or “free”; 
it must be set instrumentally in service to the demands of the difference 
principle. The point is that departures in taxation from optimal tax policy 
will cause significant economic distortions (for example, less than 
 
 89. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 52, at 136 (“[Optimal taxation’s] central question is what 
level of taxation would best promote welfare (either weighted in favor of the worse off or not), given 
the welfare losses caused by the behavioral effects of the income tax.”). 
 90. Kordana & Tabachnick, supra note 68, at 150 (“arguments about property, contract, 
bankruptcy, and tax policy per se are moot . . . maximizing theorist[s] needs to select bankruptcy policy 
as part of the overall scheme that best satisfies the distributive principles . . . the maximizing scheme 
has obliterated the principled distinction between [all private law rules] and taxation . . . .”); Kordana 
& Tabachnick, supra note 68, at 614 (“given Rawls’s post-institutional conception of property, taxation 
is not a matter of redistribution, as it is typically understood in our public lexicon, but rather a matter 
of distribution.”); David H. Blankfein-Tabachnick, Intellectual Property Doctrine and Midlevel 
Principles, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1315, 1347 (2013) (“In selecting legal rules and institutions, there is not 
much latitude, given the maximizing demands of the distributive principles. Maximizing principles 
require a specific set of property rules conjoined with an optimal tax rate . . . The important insight 
can be pushed a step further, the conception of what is optimal changes when one shifts between 
maximands. What is optimal for a utilitarian regime (maximizing net aggregate utility) cannot also be 
optimal for a Rawlsian (maximizing the position of the least well-off).”); David Blankfein-Tabachnick, 
Property, Duress and Consensual Relationships, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1013, 1027 (2016) ( details of 
ownership and . . . economic exchange…in conjunction with contract law, property, and the system of 
taxation and transfer . . . [are] components[s] of the complete set of economic institutions.”); cf. 
Dimick, supra note 79, at 12 n.41:  
This also strongly affects whether the legal system or the tax system should be used to 
redistribute income. Depending on how much society or a policy-maker is willing to reduce 
inequality, an inefficient legal redistribution may or may not be a preferable 
alternative . . . An inefficient legal redistribution may reduce inequality more, but may 
deliver lower social welfare because of greater economic distortions. In contrast, this same 
legal redistribution may well be superior to the optimal tax policy under a Rawlsian social 
welfare function, which creates larger economic distortions. 
Dimick recognizes that alternative distributive goals demand changes to tax policy but seemingly fails 
to recognize that in a Rawlsian legal scheme tax and property rules must be set in conjunction with 
one another for optimal taxation to obtain, due to the unyielding demands of the maximand. This 
causes Dimick to erroneously tinker with what he describes as “optimal tax” in the Rawlsian scheme. 
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efficient maximization of the position of the least well-off). In other 
words, tax policy is not available to “undo” the consequences of other 
non-optimal legal rules in terms of meeting the demands of the 
maximand (that is, the valueless, in the hands of F, fishery in the new 
difference-principle-oriented scheme). 
E. PROPERTY ALLOCATIONS AND PROPERTY LAW RULES 
Return now to the fishery example, where another possible response 
from a proponent of the Kaplow and Shavell claim would perhaps be that 
a property “allocation” (that is, who owns the fishery) has changed, but 
that “property law rules” need not change. In the wealth-maximizing 
scheme, property law rules consistent with the maximand were crafted. 
Now, in the new scheme, one might maintain, under that same rubric, F 
would sell the fishery to G, on the grounds that it was no longer valuable 
to him since his talent for caviar production is irrelevant now that the 
industry has collapsed; however, the fishery is of some value to G. Thus, 
it could be maintained that the “rules” or doctrines of property law have 
not been altered in the new scheme, only particular property 
“allocations” have been changed. Arguably, given the insights of the 
Coase Theorem, the fishery will be given to the highest value user in the 
new scheme, G, without requiring a change in property law rules. 
Such an argument, however, ignores the fact that it is implausible 
that the new scheme can afford to rely on consensual transactions, across 
all non-tax and transfer legal rules, in order to best satisfy the demands 
of the difference principle. Neither wealth-maximizers nor proponents of 
the Rawlsian difference principle are committed in principle to 
consensual transactions, as found in Lockean-libertarianism. Both would 
be required to assign property entitlements in an instrumentalist 
fashion, given the demands of their respective maximands in situations 
where voluntary transacting would not yield as efficient (to the goals of 
the scheme) a result.91 So, for example, wealth maximization would 
 
 91. Kordana & Tabachnick, supra note 68, at 598, 600 (“[f]or the Rawlsian, contract law is a 
matter of (re)distribution, consistent with a post-institutional right to freedom of contract . . . freedom 
of contract, for Rawlsianism, is to be defined as the scheme of contracting options constructed as open 
or free (in the post-institutional sense) in conjunction with the overall scheme of legal and political 
institutions that, when taken as a whole, best serves the demands of the two principles of justice”). 
Consider, for example, the Gautreaux case, where section 8 housing vouchers were provided to the 
poor in an attempt to achieve the goal of “deconcentration” in the urban ghetto. This aim was thought 
to be achievable only under the rubric of entitlement rules that had been altered so as to meet a 
distributive aim; the acceptance of section 8 housing vouchers on the part of landlords is mandatory, 
as opposed to being left open to fully consensual market transactions. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 
(1976). For discussion on deconcentration, see Owen M. Fiss, What Should Be Done for Those Who 
Have Been Left Behind, in A WAY OUT: AMERICA’S GHETTOS AND THE LEGACY OF RACISM 34 (Joshua 
Cohen et al. eds., 2003) (“Putting an end to the social dynamics that have transformed the ghetto over 
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assign air rights to airlines rather than landowners, so as to avoid the loss 
of wealth-creating flying occurring in a scheme in which air rights 
remained bundled with land rights in a fee simple. 
Imagine that in a wealth-maximizing scheme a certain asset was to 
be allocated to an entrepreneur on the grounds of her being able to best 
utilize the asset. Due to decreased net aggregate wealth, that particular 
opportunity is no longer available in the new scheme governed by the 
Rawlsian difference principle, as was the case in the caviar fishery 
example above, where an alternative use of the fishery was necessitated. 
This necessitates a change in the expansive property rules which govern 
allocations. G’s lack of skill or capital cannot as efficiently be overcome 
through an infusion of tax dollars; as a mandatory asset allocation is, in 
our example, less costly, while introducing additional taxation to pay for 
additional transfer to G itself introduces further distortions (see chart 
below, row 4). 
Our argument, then, is that, if assets are, in the new scheme 
governed by the difference principle, left assigned as they were in the 
previous wealth-maximizing scheme because following Kaplow and 
Shavell’s dictum, no changes would be made to any legal rules other than 
income taxation and transfer, the new scheme will fail to maximize the 
position of the least well-off (see chart below, row 2). The reason for this 
is that given the decrease in net aggregate wealth in the new scheme, 
some assets have decreased in value such that their reassignment is now 
required in order to satisfy the new maximand. Attempting to tax the 
income derived from the asset in its original assignment in order to 
transfer income to the least well-off cannot possibly satisfy the new 
scheme’s maximand as compared to directly reassigning the asset (see 
chart below, row 1). Thus, the expansive rules of property law must, 
contra Kaplow and Shavell’s dictum, be reconstructed in response to the 
new distributive principle. 
 
 
 
 
 
the last . . . forty years into a structure of subordination would require . . . many deep interventions 
into the life of that community”). 
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 S1: 
Constrained 
Wealth 
Maximization 
Governing All 
Legal Rules 
S2:  
Kaplow and Shavell’s 
position: Difference 
Principle governing 
Taxation and 
Transfer as sole 
instrument for 
Equity-Oriented 
Distributive Aim; 
Other Legal Rules 
Remain as in S1 
S3:  
Our position: 
Difference 
Principle 
Governing All 
Legal Rules with 
Some Property 
Reassignments; 
No Commitment 
to S1 Rules 
“Luxury” 
Asset 
Value 
100 50 70 
Income of 
Least 
Well-Off 
10 15 17 
Income of 
Most 
Well-Off 
50 30 31 
Tax rate 20% 60% 55% 
F. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
We are now in a position to discuss the scope of our claim that 
changes in expansive property law can dominate changes in income 
taxation and transfer when satisfying equity-oriented demands. Consider 
first a scheme which maximizes net aggregate wealth. Assets will be 
assigned to their highest value use.92 That is, an asset’s ownership 
entitlement will be assigned to the person(s) who will use it to create the 
most wealth. The asset’s entitlement could be assigned to other 
person(s), but all such persons would provide less (or, perhaps on 
occasion, the same) wealth, and so such potential assignments would be 
rejected in favor of the wealth-maximizing assignment. Keep in mind 
that in maximizing net aggregate wealth, distributive justice-oriented 
patterns are ignored. 
Now consider a second scheme, with a different distributive 
principle in place¾the quasi-Rawlsian difference principle, maximizing 
 
 92. Assignments occur either directly, if the assumptions of the Coase Theorem are not in place 
such that initial entitlements are crucial, or through the operation of consensual transactions if the 
alienability of particular assets is instrumental to wealth maximization. 
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the position of the least well-off.93 With respect to a particular asset, that 
asset might be left assigned to the person(s) who owned it in the first 
scheme. Importantly, because the difference principle will inevitably 
result in a scheme with less net aggregate wealth than in the  
wealth-maximizing scheme, those who used the asset to create the most 
wealth in the original scheme may no longer serve to maximize wealth 
with the asset in the new scheme. Additionally, the amount of wealth 
generated by the allocation of the asset to particular person(s) will also 
likely be different than in the first scheme (on average, it will be lower, 
given that the scheme is overall less wealthy, but on occasion a particular 
asset might be worth more in the difference principle scheme than it was 
under wealth maximization). 
Alternatively, the asset might be reassigned to some new person(s) 
on grounds that such assignment is useful to satisfying the demands of 
the scheme’s maximand. The new maximand demands that the position 
of the least well-off be improved, and one way to do this is to assign 
property to them. Another way is to assign the property to a high-value 
user who will produce enough wealth with it that, given the optimal tax 
to be applied to that asset, it will result in a transfer to the least well-off 
that improves their position. The original assignment of the asset was not 
made with this result in mind; it therefore may not be the assignment 
that is instrumental to the maximization of the least well-off’s position. 
Therefore, and crucially, the income “delivered” to the least well-off by 
the reassignment of the asset may generate, in that scheme, both more 
net income and more income to the least well-off than does the original 
assignment (see chart above, columns 2 and 3). 
Take, for example, ML the mediocre lawyer. In a wealth-maximizing 
scheme, ML is assigned to BigLaw on the grounds that he contributes 
more net aggregate wealth (say, $200,000) under this assignment than 
under all other assignments, including his next best assignment, which 
is as a teacher (say, $180,000). Now, consider the situation when the 
distributive principle has been changed. Assume that ML continues to 
create the most net aggregate wealth if he remains assigned to BigLaw. 
However, since taxes have been increased in order to generate revenue 
to transfer to the least well-off, net aggregate wealth has decreased, as 
compared to the initial scheme. As a result ML’s assignment to BigLaw 
 
 93. Note that our analysis remains the same if the new equity-orientation required the satisfaction 
of some “fixed” goal, such as the provision of a “decent social minimum” to all. The new scheme, 
subject to such a goal, is still a constrained maximizing scheme (that is, wealth maximization, now 
subject to both the basic entitlement constraint and the decent social minimum constraint). Again, the 
new scheme drops below the wealth maximization ceiling, relative prices change, and the 
reassignment of some assets is required in order to meet the demands of the (constrained) maximizing 
distributive principle. 
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now contributes less net aggregate wealth (say, $100,000) than it did in 
the initial scheme. 
In the alternative, ML might be assigned to teaching. This 
contributes even less net aggregate wealth (say, $90,000) than his 
assignment to BigLaw. Importantly, however, the distribution of that 
wealth differs. Assume for simplicity that ML’s salary is the same in 
either assignment (say, $40,000), but that BigLaw benefits by $60,000 
while his students benefit by $50,000 if he teaches. If the students 
constitute the least well-off, and if the optimal tax rate on BigLaw is, say, 
ti=67%, then his assignment to BigLaw only improves the position of the 
least well-off by $40,000. Crucially, an equity-oriented tax scheme is not 
merely a matter of redividing the revenue derived from a  
wealth-maximizing scheme since net aggregate wealth decreases when 
income taxation increases as would be demanded by the new distributive 
principle. The direct assignment of ML to teaching satisfies the demands 
of the difference principle; his assignment to BigLaw fails to do so. The 
difference principle scheme mandates his reassignment to teaching. It is 
not possible that the failure to increase the position of the least well-off 
by assigning ML to teaching can be compensated by instead assigning 
ML to what would be his position in a wealth-maximizing scheme, 
BigLaw. Such an assignment produces an additional $10,000 of wealth, 
but that is insufficient, given the scheme’s optimal tax regime, to provide 
enough revenue for transfer to the least well-off so as to, as the scheme 
demands, maximize their position. Thus, the expansive rules of property 
law must reflect the new equity-orientation of the scheme. Kaplow and 
Shavell’s tax and transfer preference is unfounded. 
Of course, sometimes income taxation and transfer is the preferred 
instrument. If ML were a terrific rather than a mediocre lawyer he might 
well remain with the BigLaw assignment even as the maximand shifted 
(that is, if he produces enough more wealth as a lawyer versus as a 
teacher). Analogously, if ML is an outstanding teacher then the 
assignment of ML to teaching might be the best assignment under both 
maximands. It is the conjunction of his being a mediocre lawyer and a 
reasonable teacher that leads the wealth-maximizing scheme to assign 
him to BigLaw, thus creating a slightly wealthier society, while the  
equity-oriented scheme instead better achieves its goal of maximizing the 
position of the least well-off by harnessing his talents at teaching. 
IV.  THE DEMAND FOR FORMAL EQUALITY AND THE USE OF  
PRIVATE LAW RULES AS EQUITY-ORIENTED INSTRUMENTS 
A standard objection to the use of private law instruments for 
equity-oriented aims, perhaps, is that adjudication based on the relative 
wealth of parties in civil litigation is a violation of what one might call 
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formal equality. That is, the relative wealth of litigants should, as a matter 
of fundamental legality, be understood as irrelevant because an arbitrary 
quality of the litigants, such as race or sex. The objection invites the 
conclusion that the use of private law rules for equity-oriented purposes 
would lead to unjustifiably unequal treatment of civil litigants. 
Our response to this objection is twofold. First, the objection fails to 
recognize that the outcome of any civil litigation is contingent upon 
property baselines; civil litigation often is the very question of which 
property baselines ought to be adopted and why. Taking property 
assignments as given, conventional or “natural” is to adopt a conception 
of entitlement. However, the question in civil litigation is often over the 
warrant or justification for such entitlement arrangements. 
Second, though closely related, the objection that achieving equity-
oriented aims through private law rules yields unequal treatment is 
addressed at the wrong level. The establishment of private law rules, like 
the setting of income taxation rates, is not, in the first instance, about 
particular litigating parties, but rather is a matter of general institutional 
design or rulemaking. The manner in which private law rules are 
constructed (for example, the first-in-time-rule,94 the choice of limited 
versus unlimited liability for business enterprises,95 the relative 
preference of tort versus contract creditors in bankruptcy,96 or the 
demand for unitization where landowners’ interests conflict in  
oil-drilling97) are to be determined according to the demands of  
overarching distributive principles or aims which govern the scheme. 
Raising an objection from “inequality” to an aspect of the scheme 
must sound in a differing conception or principled account of equality 
from that embodied in the scheme. Where private law rules are set to 
keep with fully justified government aims, or governed by morally or 
politically justifiable distributive principles, the mere fact of differential 
treatment of parties is insufficient to raise a claim of unjustifiable or 
wrongful inequality; the objection is addressed to the wrong level. Our 
point is that once one acknowledges that a scheme of legal and political 
rules is fully justified by morally acceptable overarching distributive 
aims, which themselves embody a conception of equality, one cannot 
 
 94. E.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 CAI. R. 175, 178–80 (N.Y. 1805) (constructing a rule that hot pursuit of 
a wild animal does not create any rights in the pursuer). For a discussion of the socioeconomic clash 
between the parties in this classic case, see Bethany R. Berger, It’s Not About the Fox: The Untold 
History of Pierson v. Post, 55 DUKE L.J. 1089 (2006). 
 95. E.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for 
Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991). 
 96. E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured 
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996). 
 97. E.g., Steven N. Wiggins & Gary D. Libecap, Oil Field Unitization: Contractual Failure in the 
Presence of Imperfect Information, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 368 (1985). 
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coherently raise an objection of unjust inequality simply owing to the fact 
of nonequivalent treatment. Any difference in treatment is justified by 
the distributive principles, which define a conception of equality. Any 
objection needs to be addressed to the governing principles themselves, 
as opposed to the outcome of the application of legal rules designed 
instrumentally in service to the principles’ demands. In this, private law 
rules are identical to income taxation in all relevant respects. 
To be clear, for example, the question of whether tort creditors 
should be given preference over contract creditors (as they presently are 
not) in bankruptcy is a question coherently answered only by appeal to 
distributive goals. If one accepts, for instance, the wealth maximization 
principle and also acknowledges that wealth can be maximized if and 
only if tort creditors are given such preference in bankruptcy so as to 
provide a disincentive to externalize costs, it would be incoherent to then 
raise an objection on behalf of contract creditors owing to disparate 
treatment at trial. Such bankruptcy preference rules are governed by 
distributive principles which define the conception of equality; disparate 
treatment is insufficient to demonstrate an unjustifiable outcome. 
CONCLUSION 
Equity-oriented distributive goals are not always more efficiently 
achieved via income taxation and transfer rather than private law rules. 
This claim, chiefly associated with Kaplow and Shavell, is not about the 
acceptability of equity-oriented political values or distributive patterns, 
but rather, the most economically efficient manner of achieving such 
ends. Were Kaplow and Shavell correct in this claim, equity-oriented 
private law constructions would be best understood as inefficient means 
of achieving equity-oriented ends. As a matter of institutional design, 
such equity-oriented aims would be more efficiently achieved via the use 
of income taxation and transfer, while at the same time constructing 
private law rules in a manner in keeping with constrained wealth 
maximization. We have shown that Kaplow and Shavell’s conclusion in 
favor of the tax and transfer preference, however prominent, is 
significantly problematic. Their claim fails to acknowledge the crucial 
efficiency role that property law entitlements must play in achieving any 
distributive end, equity-oriented or otherwise. We have shown that once 
this point is recognized, the tax and transfer preference no longer holds. 
Maximally efficient institutional design at times requires that equity-
oriented demands be met through the private law rules of property and 
that income taxation and transfer is not always superior in its efficiency 
to such constructions. 
Given the maximizing goal, no rules can be ignored, that is, merely 
“taken as they are found” in any actual conventional property scheme. 
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What is needed is the selection of the complete scheme of legal and 
political rules which maximizes the position of the least well-off in 
comparison to all other possible schemes. In this inter-schemic 
comparison, failing to consider altering the full range of legal rules 
simply because they are, for some unstated exogenous reason, to be taken 
as conventional or merely as they are found, is to fail to maximize, that 
is, fail to implement the distributive principle. For example, it is our 
understanding that takings cases represent the altering of property 
entitlements in service to distributive aims.98 
Kaplow and Shavell’s analysis appears to focus on changes to specific rules 
within an otherwise fixed scheme, without comment on the nature of the 
remainder of the scheme’s other legal rules, specifically the structure of the 
details of ownership. In other words, their analysis seems to be intra-
schemic rather than inter-schemic: It contrasts changes of specific rules 
within a single scheme as opposed to the relative comparison of competing 
complete schemes.99 Therefore, their analysis seems not to recognize that 
once a change in maximand (that is, the difference principle versus wealth 
maximization) is adopted, all rules must be constructed in its service. The 
conclusion that tax and transfer is more efficient than other legal rules in 
achieving equity-oriented ends requires inter-schemic comparisons among 
complete schemes of legal and political rules.   
 
 98. Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 
104 (1978); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). 
 99. See POGGE, supra note 67, at 71. 
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